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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF POLITICAL STUDIES

December 29, 1943.

EU - Mr. Matthews:

On behalf of the Inter-Divisional Committees on the Balkan-Danubian Region and on Greece, I am herewith submitting the following documents:

Greece:Bulgaria. Territorial Problems: Greek-Bulgarian Frontier (H-51); Views of the Inter-Divisional Committees on the Balkan-Danubian Region and on Greece (H-51 Supplement)

Disposition of Macedonia (H-110); Views of the Inter-Divisional Committee on Greece and on the Balkan-Danubian Region (H-110 Supplement)

Mr. Carl F. Norden (EU) has served with the Committee while studying these problems.

Any comments which you may care to make on the memoranda will be considered by the Committee as quickly as possible. The Committee would also appreciate having your comments, as soon as possible, on the following memoranda which were sent to your office sometime ago:

Serb-Croat Relations (H-99); Views of the Inter-Divisional Committee on the Balkan-Danubian Region (H-99 Supplement Preliminary). December 6, 1943.

The Yugoslav-Bulgarian Frontier North of Macedonia (H-63); Views of the Inter-Divisional Committee on the Balkan-Danubian Region (H-63 Supplement) November 8, 1943.

The International Status of Albania (H-97 Preliminary); Views of the Inter-Divisional Committees on the Balkan-Danubian Region and on Greece (H-97 Supplement)

already submitted

State Dept. Political Studies Division

SECRET FILE

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768.741/12-2943

This document must be returned to the RMR Central Files

We have had an expression of views from the divisions concerned, with the exception of the Division of European Affairs.

The Committee plans to keep abreast of further developments which may cause modification of the documents and will resubmit them for review when appropriate.

Harry N. Howard

Harry N. Howard, Chairman

768.74/12-2949

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H 51 (Supplement)
December 23, 1943.

GREECE-BULGARIA: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS
GREEK-BULGARIAN FRONTIER

Views of the Inter-Divisional Committees
on Greece and on the Balkan-Danubian Region

The committees were in full agreement that Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, occupied by Bulgarian troops during the present war, should be restored to Greece. The view was accepted that this restoration should be unconditional, and that any provisions which might be made for the access of Bulgarian trade to the Aegean should be the subject of separate negotiations.

At the same time, it was agreed that there was no ethnic basis for the cession of any large area in southern Bulgaria to Greece. The committees believed that minor strategic rectifications of the frontier, from which Greece might derive substantial military advantages and which would not create new minority problems, would be justified.

Drafted by:

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Inter-Divisional Committees on Greece and on the Balkan-Danubian Region

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H-51
September 23, 1943

GREECE-BULGARIA: TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS:

GREEK-BULGARIAN FRONTIER

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the determination of the boundary between Greece and Bulgaria in Eastern Macedonia, Western Thrace and the Rhodope region.

The Greek territory occupied by Bulgaria in 1941 consists of Eastern Macedonia, comprising the Greek departments of Serres, Drama and Kavalla, and Western Thrace, which includes the Greek departments of Rhodope and Hevros. The area of this region is 5,462 square miles. When these two territories were annexed by Greece in 1913 and 1923, respectively, the population was Turkish in majority with a large admixture of Greeks and a smaller Bulgarian minority. The subsequent exchanges of population between Greece, one the one hand, and Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other, resulted in the settlement of a large Greek population in the disputed areas. Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace together had a total population estimated at 716,593 in 1928 (Greek census) and at 645,700 in 1943 (Bulgarian budget law). The population of the former region is almost exclusively Greek, while the latter has a minority of some 84,000 Turks. In the years following the exchange of populations the Greek Government went to considerable expense to provide housing and agricultural equipment for the new settlers.

This area accounts for some 20 percent by value of the cereals and tobacco produced in Greece, and has small deposits of coal, iron ore, gold and peat. A standard guage railroad, connecting Salonika with Serres, Drama, Xanthi, Alexandroupolis and Demotika, joins the international railroad south of Adrianople. The port of Kavalla is the eighth largest in Greece, and handled 278,000 tons of shipping in 1935.

The

The Bulgarian claim to these territories is based on considerations of economic necessity and historical possession. Western Thrace was annexed by Bulgaria in 1913 and was augmented by a further small annexation of Turkish territory along the right bank of the Maritsa River in 1915. In 1919 it was ceded to the Principal Allied Powers, who in return promised to provide an outlet for Bulgarian trade through one of the Aegean ports. During the negotiations at Lausanne in 1923, the Bulgarian Government declared that it could invest no capital in the development of an Aegean port unless the hinterland were either under its own sovereignty or established as an autonomous region. In view of the cession of these territories to Greece, the Bulgarian Government rejected both the proposal that it construct a port in Western Thrace and the Greek offer of special facilities in Salonika or one of the other Aegean ports. Bulgaria claims that an outlet to the Aegean under its sovereignty is essential for the development of its foreign market. Salonika, however, is a more suitable port for the bulk of the Bulgarian exports from this region and the unimpeded use of that port would provide an adequate outlet for Bulgarian trade.

After the invasion of Greece by the German army in the spring of 1941, Bulgaria occupied Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace with the intention of annexing them at the end of the war. Bulgarian civil administration has been extended to them. It has been estimated that some 50,000 Bulgarians have settled in this region since 1941, and that perhaps as many as 80,000 Greeks have been forced to emigrate. In addition, the Bulgarian Government has attempted to stimulate the agricultural production and to develop the transportation facilities.

The Prime Minister of the Greek Government-in-exile has stated in a memorandum presented to the State Department on June 12, 1942 that Greece desires an extension of its frontiers "to the Rhodope Mountains". The claim apparently includes that part of southern Bulgaria which extends northwards from the 1940 boundary roughly to the Kresna Defile in the West and to the Arda River in the East. This region, with an area of approximately 4,500 square miles, had a population in 1934 of 390,000 of which over a third was Turkish and rest Bulgarian. There were less than 200 Greeks in this region.

II. RECOMMENDED

II. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

A. Restoration of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace to Greece

This solution was recommended by the Territorial Subcommittee.

This solution would restore to Greece the frontier of 1940. The population is largely Greek by nationality. These areas were taken from Greece by force of arms, and the Bulgarian claim is justified only by the need for a free trade outlet to the Aegean Sea. This solution might be accompanied by a Greek offer to Bulgaria of adequate port facilities in Salonika or one of the other Aegean ports.

1. Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee

It was the view of the subcommittee that the ethnic claims of Greece to these areas were beyond dispute and that they should be returned to that country after the war. At the same time, it recognized Bulgaria's need for a trade outlet on the Aegean and recommended that the restoration of the disputed areas to Greece be accompanied by positive economic measures designed to provide such an outlet.

III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION

A. Restoration of Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, and Cession of the Rhodope Region to Greece

The proponents of this solution argue that the cession of the Rhodope region is necessary in order to guarantee Greece against another invasion from the North. There is no ethnic basis for such a cession, and its contribution to Greece's strategic position is problematical.

Whereas

Whereas it is apparent that the soundest basis for Greek security lies in cooperation with its Balkan neighbors, the cession of the Rhodope region would render friendly relations between Greece and Bulgaria impossible and would thus serve to weaken Greek security.

IV. DOCUMENTATION

IV. DOCUMENTATION

A. Maps

European Series

Map 3 Political Division of Europe, July, 1943

Eastern European Series

Map 13 Boundary Problems of Eastern Europe

B. Committee Discussions

Territorial Subcommittee: February 5, 1943

V. PLANS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Greek-Bulgarian Frontier: Alternative Boundaries

Greek-Bulgarian Frontier, 1913-1923

PS:CEBlack:mhp:jrb;jc

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H-110 (Supplement)
December 24, 1943

DISPOSITION OF MACEDONIA

Views of the Inter-Divisional Committees on Greece and on the Balkan-Danubian Region

The members of the two committees concurred in the view that any settlement of the Macedonian question should be preceded by the restoration to Greece and Yugoslavia of the territories occupied by the Bulgarian army during the course of the present war. This solution might be accompanied by the granting of local privileges to the Macedonian Slavs in Yugoslavia and of minority rights to the Slavs of Greece.

The two committees agreed that changes in the pre-war status quo should be made only on the initiative, and as a result of full agreement between, the states concerned. It was thought that a compromise solution reached by mutual agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, either in the form of a frontier rectification or by the creation of an autonomous Slavic Macedonia within a general South Slav federation, would represent a contribution to the stability of the relations among the South Slav peoples but would be viewed with alarm by Greece, Turkey and Rumania. Within the framework of a Balkan federation, however, an autonomous Slavic Macedonia would probably find wider acceptance. At the same time the fact was stressed that, since Greek Macedonia was overwhelmingly Greek in ethnic character, there was no likelihood that any solution which involved the alteration of its pre-war status would receive the support of the Greek Government.

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Secret

H-110
December 24, 1943

DISPOSITION OF MACEDONIA

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of Macedonia.

During the course of the present war Bulgaria occupied the whole of Yugoslav Macedonia and Greek Eastern Macedonia, with the intent of annexing these territories at the end of the war. The districts taken from Yugoslavia had 966,000 inhabitants, while those taken from Greece had a population of 413,000. The claims of the Yugoslav and Greek Governments that these territories be returned to them, and the possibly conflicting demands of the peoples concerned, will probably result in a difficult situation at the end of the war.

The disposition of the various territories included under the name of Macedonia became an acute issue at the end of the nineteenth century while they were still a part of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish Macedonia had an area estimated at 25,000 square miles, and a population of approximately 2,270,000, including some 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians and 100,000 Jews. The Macedonian Slavs, who are closely related to the peoples of both the neighboring Slav states, became a bone of contention between Bulgaria and Serbia. Thanks to favorable political conditions in the Ottoman Empire, Bulgarian cultural propaganda in Macedonia succeeded in gaining a dominant position after 1870, and the view was widely accepted on the eve of the Balkan wars that a majority of the Macedonian Slavs were Bulgarian in sentiment. At the same time, there was a strong indigenous movement favoring the creation of an autonomous Macedonia.

Macedonia was liberated from Turkish rule in the first Balkan war, but the inability of Bulgaria, Serbia

and

and Greece to agree on a plan of partition led to a further war among the three allies in 1913. As a result of the defeat of Bulgaria in this latter conflict, the greater part of Macedonia was divided between Serbia and Greece. At the end of the World War, Serbia added to its share a small district of Bulgarian Macedonia.

The Macedonian territory annexed by Yugoslavia in 1913 and 1919 has an area of approximately 8,360 square miles. Of the total population of 966,000 (1931) over two thirds are Christian Slavs, while some 290,000 are Moslem Turks and Albanians and about 10,000 are Vlachs. This region is devoted primarily to subsistence farming. While it is not a rich agricultural region, Macedonia leads the other parts of Yugoslavia in the production of rye and barley, as well as of tobacco and opium. Over two-thirds of the chrome output of Yugoslavia comes from the region of Skoplje and Tetovo. There are also reported to be important undeveloped deposits of lignite, manganese, iron ore, pyrite, lead and zinc. Yugoslav Macedonia is served by the trunk railroad from Skoplje to Salonika.

The Rumanian Government advanced strong claims before the last war as self-appointed guardian of the Rumanian-speaking Vlachs, in the hope of winning territorial compensations elsewhere, but its interest today is limited to obtaining customary minority rights for them.

The approximately 677,000 (1931) Slavs in this region have been the chief source of controversy between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in recent years. At the end of the last war, it was generally believed by travellers, by American missionaries, and by the members of the American Peace Commission, that a majority of the Macedonian Slavs favored either autonomy or annexation to Bulgaria. Since that time, however, the agitation which has kept the Macedonian

controversy alive has come primarily from the Macedonian émigrés in Bulgaria. There is reason to believe that apart from restrictions on the freedom of speech and press the population of Yugoslav Macedonia was not seriously misgoverned. There was nevertheless widespread discontent on the part of the Macedonians as a result of the domination of their local affairs by the Serb-controlled administration. The views of the Slavs in this region remain problematical, however, and without further evidence it is not possible to determine what solution they would prefer. There is some reason to believe that the Slavs of northern Macedonia, in the region of Skoplje, have been better assimilated by the Yugoslav system than those to the south. It is the view of the Yugoslav Government that all of the Macedonian Slavs are Serbs, and it recognized the possibility of no solution other than the restoration of its 1940 frontiers.

Greek Macedonia has an area of 13,358 square miles, with 1,633,150 (1936) inhabitants. While this population is predominantly Greek, as a result of the exchanges of population with Turkey and Bulgaria after the World War, it still included in 1940 a Slavic-speaking population of some 80,000 according to Greek estimates. The 413,000 inhabitants of Eastern Macedonia, the territory occupied by Bulgaria during the present war, are almost exclusively Greek-speaking. Macedonia is the richest agricultural region in Greece, possessing 30 percent of the cultivated acreage of the whole country. It is particularly important for the production of cereals and tobacco. It also has one quarter of the forest acreage of Greece. Eastern Macedonia is significant primarily as the center of the tobacco industry. Salonika is the second largest port in Greece, serving not only that country but also Yugoslavia through a free zone established in 1923. The Greek Government recognizes no minority problem in Macedonia and maintains that the Slavs are Bulgarian-speaking Greeks. At the same time, the Yugoslav Government maintains that the Slavs in Greek Macedonia are Serbs.

Bulgarian Macedonia, acquired from Turkey in 1913, has an area of approximately 3,300 square miles and a population of 207,000 (1934) which, with the exception of some 6,000 Turks, is almost entirely Slavic. It is an essentially poor region, with no industry and inconsiderable mineral resources. The tobacco crop raised in the Struma and Mesta valleys is the backbone of its economy. It is served by a narrow-gauge railroad, which is in the process of being converted to standard gauge, extending down the Struma valley to Petrich. The role of Macedonia in Bulgarian affairs has been greatly magnified by the large number of influential Macedonian refugees residing in the capital city of Sofia. The large share which the controversy over Macedonia has played in Bulgarian foreign policy, and the dominant role of Macedonian nationalists in Bulgarian politics, have made the Macedonian question one of the leading issues in Bulgarian public life. Relations with Yugoslavia have been the key to Bulgarian foreign policy since the last war, and the occupation of Yugoslav Macedonia by Bulgarian troops in 1941 represented the logical fulfilment of Bulgaria's claims. The government and the bulk of public opinion in Bulgaria regard all Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians. As a result of the exchange of populations with Greece, however, the acquisition of the whole of Greek Macedonia ceased to be an objective of Bulgarian policy and the occupation of Eastern Macedonia was motivated primarily by strategic and economic considerations.

Since the end of the nineteenth century there has been a strong movement among native Macedonians, under the slogan of "Macedonia for the Macedonians", in favor of the creation of an independent Macedonian state. The supporters of this view originally envisaged the creation of an autonomous province within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, and some form of independence for the entire region has continued to be the goal of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. After the last war both the right-wing and left-wing branches of that movement,

while engaged in a bloody conflict with each other for control of the organization, held the view that the Macedonians were a people distinct from both the Serbs and the Bulgars and deserving of an independent status. It was necessary for the Bulgarian Government to crush the autonomist Macedonian organization before it was free to pursue its present policy. There is evidence that a considerable number of Macedonian Slavs still nourish a desire for an autonomous status.

II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. Retention of the 1940 Frontiers

The retention of the 1940 frontiers would involve the surrender of the parts of Yugoslav Macedonia and Greek Eastern Macedonia occupied by Bulgaria since 1941. This is the solution which will be demanded by the Yugoslav and Greek Governments. This solution might be accompanied by measures guaranteeing civil liberties in these regions. In Yugoslav Macedonia, this might take the form either of local autonomy or, at least, a guarantee of cultural freedom. In Greek Macedonia, enforcement of the customary minority rights might be required. If there were no specific guarantees for the Slavs in Greek Macedonia, the same objective might be achieved by the enforcement of an international bill of rights designed to protect all minorities.

The main objection to this solution, in the case of Yugoslav Macedonia, is that it might not accord with the wishes of the population concerned. It is not unlikely that, if a plebiscite were held at the end of the war, the majority of the Slavic inhabitants would favor some form of independent status or incorporation in Bulgaria. In the case of Greek Macedonia, on the other hand, no such question is likely to arise.

B. Cession

B. Cession of the Strumitsa District to Bulgaria

The situation might arise in which, if the wishes of the local population were clear, Yugoslavia would agree to make some concessions to Bulgaria. This might be accomplished by ceding to Bulgaria the Yugoslav district of Strumitsa. This district, with a predominantly Slavic population of 39,000 (1931), was ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria in 1913 and then went to Yugoslavia in 1919. This is the only part of Macedonia which changed hands after 1913, and a return to the frontiers of that year rather than to those of 1919 might, under certain conditions, have a beneficial effect on the long-term mutual relations of the Balkan states. While this solution could only be achieved by agreement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, it is probable that it would be opposed by Greece because of its traditional opposition to the strengthening of the Bulgarian strategic position on its northern frontier.

C. Compromise Line Between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria

If an agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, under greatly altered social and political conditions, should be attempted a compromise might be based on the line agreed upon in the Bulgarian-Serbian alliance of March, 1912. This line, running from Mt. Golem to Lake Ohrid, was voluntarily accepted by Serbia as a satisfactory southern frontier before its plans were altered by the course of military events. If such a line were agreed upon it would leave 422,000 inhabitants, including a minority of almost 200,000 Turkish and Albanian Moslems, on the Yugoslav side of the frontier. The Bulgarian share would have some 544,000 inhabitants, including 95,000 Moslems. This line would leave the rich mineral resources of Macedonia in Yugoslavia, but would transfer the greater part of the tobacco-raising region to Bulgaria. The rail communications of Macedonia would not be disrupted by such a division. The trunk line following the Vardar valley would

cross the frontier between Veles and Skoplje. As for the two incompleted transverse railroads the northern, connecting Ohrid, Skoplje and Kumanova with Kyustendil, would remain in Yugoslavia while the southern, joining Bitolja, Veles and Štip with Gorna Dzhumaya, would go to Bulgaria. The Greek Government would look with the greatest disfavor on any such compromise agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as constituting a serious menace to Greek security. It is likewise probable that the Turkish Government would raise similar objections.

D. Cession of Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslavia and Greece

The Greek Government-in-exile has already advanced claims, in a memorandum to the Department of State dated June 12, 1942, to Bulgarian territory with a view to guaranteeing the strategic security of its position in Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. It is not unlikely that the Yugoslav Government will make a similar demand. These demands could be satisfied by ceding the two western districts of Bulgarian Macedonia, with a population of 77,500 to Yugoslavia and the three eastern, with some 129,500 inhabitants, to Greece. Bulgarian Macedonia is of strategic importance to both Yugoslavia and Greece in that it represents the logical starting point for a westward military thrust designed to drive a widge between Yugoslavia and Greece. This route was used with great success by the Bulgarian army in 1915 and by the German in 1941. A further justification for this solution would be the necessity of enforcing severe retaliatory measures on an aggressive neighbor. From an ethnic point of view, while the inhabitants of the Yugoslav segment would be closely related to the other Macedonian Slavs, the territory ceded to Greece would include no Greeks at all. In neither case would this solution accord with the wishes of the population.

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As variations of this solution, Bulgarian Macedonia in its entirety might be ceded either to Yugoslavia or to Greece. In such a case, cession to Yugoslavia would be more in accordance with the ethnic character of the population. Economic resources and communications would not be a determining factor in either case. If the whole of Bulgarian Macedonia were ceded to Yugoslavia, this solution might be accompanied by the granting of a substantial degree of autonomy to all of Slavic Macedonia.

E. Confirmation of the Bulgarian Acquisitions in 1941

The Macedonian territories acquired by Bulgaria from Yugoslavia in 1941 have a population estimated by the Bulgarian Government at 1,060,000 (1943), of which some two-thirds are Macedonian Slavs. Bulgarian-occupied Greek Macedonia has a population of 413,000 which before the war was almost entirely Greek-speaking. While accurate figures are not available, it is possible that as many as 40,000 Greeks have fled Eastern Macedonia and an equal number of Bulgars settled in their place. These territories were occupied by Bulgarian troops, in the wake of the German army, with the intention of incorporating them permanently in the Bulgarian kingdom. In September 1943, after the surrender of Italy, three districts (Galičnik, Gora, Gornji Debar) bordering on Albania, with a predominantly Albanian population of 42,000, were added to Bulgarian-held Yugoslav Macedonia.

In the case of Yugoslav Macedonia it is possible, but by no means certain, that large sections of the population may express a desire for transfer to Bulgarian sovereignty or for autonomy. As for Greek Eastern Macedonia, there can be no doubt but that the population is predominantly Greek in its allegiance. This solution would meet with the bitter opposition of Yugoslav and Greek Governments, and would tend to alienate them from

their

their war-time allies. It would also run counter to the policy of the United States of recognizing no changes of frontier made in the course of the war by force of arms.

F. Establishment of Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Greek Macedonia as an Autonomous State

Macedonian nationalists for over half a century have demanded that their homeland be granted an independent, or at least an autonomous, status. The territory envisaged by this demand would have an area of approximately 25,000 square miles, and a population of between 2,584,599 (1928-34 censuses) and 2,899,964 (1934-43 estimates). On the basis of the latter figure, 53.5 percent of the total population would be Greek, 35.5 percent would be Slavic and 11 percent would be composed of Turkish and Albanian Moslems, Jews and Vlachs. The three districts bordering on Albania, which were occupied by Bulgaria in the autumn of 1943, are included in the demands of the more extreme Macedonians. They would add a predominantly Albanian population of some 42,000 to the figures cited above. As an autonomous unit, Macedonia would have per capita mineral and agricultural resources probably equal to those of the other Balkan countries. It would also possess the port of Salonika which might be made a commercial outlet for the whole central Balkan region. The obstacles to such a solution are, however, numerous. It would meet with the strenuous objections of all three of the governments concerned. The hardship caused to Greece would be particularly severe, since Macedonia has almost a third of its cultivated acreage. It would also, in all probability, fail to win the support of a majority of the inhabitants of the prospective state. While the bulk of the Slavs in Yugoslav Macedonia might possibly favor this solution, those in Bulgarian Macedonia are likely to be opposed to it. The large population of Greek Macedonia, with the probable exception of the 80,000 Slavs, would be irreconcilably opposed to it. The only circumstance under which

such

such a solution might be envisaged would be the creation of a closely integrated Balkan federation in which Macedonia might form an autonomous unit. Under such conditions, with due provision for the rights of the Slavic minority and with Salonika serving as a commercial outlet for the whole federation, an autonomous Macedonia might prove to be a feasible solution.

G. Establishment of Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia as an Autonomous State

In case the obstacles to the establishment of an independent Macedonia within its traditional frontiers should be insurmountable, as seems probable, a solution might be worked out to include only Yugoslav and Bulgarian Macedonia. Such a unit would have an area of approximately 11,660 square miles and a population of some 1,200,000, of which 80 percent would be Slavic. The addition of the three districts bordering on Albania would give it another 42,000 inhabitants. This territory would have all of the mineral deposits of Macedonia, and a valuable tobacco crop. It would lack, however, the rich agricultural and commercial resources of Greek Macedonia. Such a solution might possibly be welcomed by the Slavs of Macedonia. It might also be supported, either by the United Nations or by the Soviet Union alone, as an integral part of a movement for a Balkan or South Slavic federation. It would almost certainly be opposed, however, by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Governments as they are constituted at the present time. It is also quite likely that the Greek Government, deploring the disappearance of its common frontier with Yugoslavia and fearing possible expansionist tendencies on the part of the new Macedonian state, would oppose this solution. Only in case a Slavic federation were created in the Balkans, including the Bulgarians as well as the Yugoslav peoples, is it likely that this solution could be realized. As an autonomous unit within such a federation, the Macedonian Slavs would gain

substantial

substantial local cultural and political freedom and would be in a much stronger economic position than as an independent state. Under these conditions, moreover, the Yugoslav rights to a free port at Salonika might be extended to the whole federation. While the absorption of Macedonia into the new grouping might remove the Greek objections to an autonomous Macedonian state, it is not unlikely that the creation of a large Slavic bloc to the north would be regarded as a menace to Greek security.

Prepared, and reviewed, by:

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